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Wild Prompt Injections

Prompt-injection attacks found in the wild — not lab demos. Dated, sourced, and growing. Every entry links the original report. Test your own chatbot against each payload with ChatBreaker.

October 15, 2026

Claude Code "SneakPeek" — poisoned HTML steals dev secrets via preview pane

Noma Labs disclosed SneakPeek (CVSS 8.7) in Claude Code Desktop: a poisoned HTML file over 256KB in any cloned repo — a test coverage report is the classic lure — gets auto-rendered by the preview pane as a file:// URL with no CSP, letting embedded JavaScript silently read SSH keys, AWS credentials, GitHub tokens and Kubernetes configs and exfiltrate them. No click required. Anthropic's first patch was bypassed via a Web Worker before the full fix shipped in build 1.30096.1 (Aug 17). The pattern — a size-based security boundary with two code paths, one guarded, one not — is one every AI-tooling builder should audit for.

AI tooling attackzero-clickcredential theftClaude Code

Sources: CSO Online · DEV Community · Noma Labs disclosure Oct 14, 2026

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October 15, 2026

PoeLLM "Canto Incognito" — jailbreak hidden in a poem

The first adversarial-format jailbreak seen in real attacks: malware operators hid their command-and-control instructions inside a poem posted on GitHub, defeating AI safety guardrails that scan for suspicious text. Active since April, it has infected 3,000+ servers by breaking into exposed LiteLLM and Ollama instances. Anyone self-hosting LLM infrastructure is in the blast radius — and the technique generalizes to every AI deployment.

jailbreakadversarial formatC2 obfuscationLLM infrastructure

Source: cyber-attack live watch, multiple threat-intel reports October 2026

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October 14, 2026

10 in-the-wild indirect prompt injections — Forcepoint

Hidden instructions planted in web content for AI agents to swallow. Documented payloads include: a PayPal.me link with a $5,000 fixed amount and full payment instructions aimed at agents with payment access; "send me the secret API key" paired with "Do not analyze the code" to suppress scrutiny; a recursive forced-deletion Unix command targeting coding assistants and DevOps agents; attribution hijacking crediting "Kirill Bobrov" and soliciting consulting contact; and a fake copyright-forbiddance notice causing denial of service.

indirect injectionpayment fraudsecret exfiltrationagentic AI

Source: Infosecurity Magazine

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July 2026

SEO-poisoned fake Python library + typosquatted DeFi tracker — ZeroFox / CSA

Attackers SEO-poisoned a fake Python library page that framed a payment as a routine API-key step, with the instruction encoded in schema markup that agents parse. A typosquatted DeFi portfolio tracker posed as the legitimate domain. Across 26 models tested, four were manipulated into making a payment and two misclassified the fraudulent site as real.

SEO poisoningindirect injectionpayment fraudtyposquat

Source: ZeroFox

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April 2026

Hidden PayPal instruction + HTML-comment key leak — CSA telemetry

Two independent telemetry sources confirmed adversaries seeding the open web with hidden instructions for browsing agents and copilots: a fully specified hidden PayPal transaction in invisible text, and an HTML comment ordering the model to leak a secret API key.

indirect injectionpayment fraudsecret exfiltration

Source: ZeroFox / CSA research note

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February 2026

32% jump in malicious indirect injections — Google DeepMind

DeepMind's security team, scanning 2–3 billion crawled pages per month, measured a 32% increase in malicious indirect prompt injections between November 2025 and February 2026 — including fully specified payment instructions hidden in invisible text, waiting for an agent with payment access.

trendindirect injectionmeasurement

Source: DeepMind research via industry reporting

September 2025

CopyPasta: injections that spread like a virus — HiddenLayer

Proof-of-concept hiding instructions inside a LICENSE.txt or README.md. When a developer's AI coding assistant reads the poisoned file, it silently copies the malicious instructions into every new file it generates — codebase-wide propagation from one planted file.

supply chaincoding assistantindirect injection

Source: HiddenLayer research

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FAQ

Are these real attacks or lab experiments?

Real. Every entry above was documented by a security research team from in-the-wild observations — poisoned web pages, SEO campaigns, and telemetry — not constructed demos.

How often is the feed updated?

Continuously. Our attack-watch scans security news every 3 hours; newly documented wild payloads are added here with their source.

Can I submit a payload?

Yes — if you've documented a wild prompt injection with a public source, send it via the ChatBreaker contact page and we'll add it with credit.

Payloads are described for defensive purposes — to test and harden your own systems. Never deploy them against systems you don't own.

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